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Does foreign aid reduce terrorism? Socio-economic aid aims to address the root 
causes of terrorism by improving health care, education, justice systems, infrastructure, 
etc. in the recipient country, while military aid funds military operations in a recipient 
country. My argument is that military and economic types of aid have varying effects 
over time. Socio-economic aid will likely reduce terrorism in the long-term as it 
alleviates grievances that boost extremists’ recruitment, however, it may increase terrorist 
activity in the short run, as it provides easy targets. Military aid suppresses militant 
organizations in the short-term through “decapitation” and cutting off logistical support, 
however casualties among civilians that accompany such military operations may 
backfire in the long run.  
To test my argument, I analyze time-series cross-sectional data on U.S economic 
and military aid and terrorist activity during 1946–2010 across 142 countries. My key 
findings include: 1) in the models with country-level fixed effects, aid has no systematic 
effect on terrorism, 2) when considering the impact of economic aid on terrorism, when 
no military aid is provided, economic aid in the previous year is associated with a modest 
increase in terrorism, while economic aid provided in the previous 7 to 10 years is 









Effects of Military and Economic Aid on Terrorism:  
A Long- And Short-Term Analysis  
Haley Parker 
This paper asks whether U.S. aid reduces terrorism. Foreign assistance may be of 
two types: socio-economic aid (aims to address the root causes of terrorism by improving 
health care, education, justice systems, infrastructure, etc. in the recipient country) and 
military aid (designed to fight terrorism with force and manifests as military operations in 
a recipient country). Most countries receive both military aid and socio-economic US aid 
for long spells of time. This is why this research asks: 1) how economic and military 
types of aid influence terrorism over time, and 2) whether and how economic aid and 
military types of aid interact with each other to shape terrorist activity in recipient 
countries.  
My argument is that military and economic types of aid have varying effects over 
time. Socio-economic aid will likely reduce terrorist activity in the long-term as it 
alleviates grievances that boost recruitment by extremist organizations, however, it may 
increase terrorist activity in the short run, because it provides easy targets to terrorist 
groups. Military aid suppresses militant organizations in the short-term through 
“decapitation” and cutting off logistical support, reducing the number of terrorist attacks 
that originate from the recipient country. On the other hand, casualties among civilians 
that accompany such military operations may backfire by propelling long-term 
recruitment by terrorist organizations, leading to more attacks in the future.  




and military aid and terrorist activity during 1946 – 2010 across 142 countries. My key 
findings include: 1) in the models with country-level fixed effects, aid has no systematic 
effect on terrorism, 2) when considering the impact of economic aid on terrorism, when 
no military aid is provided, economic aid in the previous year is associated with a modest 
increase in terrorism, while economic aid provided in the previous 7 to 10 years is 
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INTRODUCTION 
“At 8:46 on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a 
nation transformed” (“The 9/11 Commission Report: Executive Summary”). Members of 
Al Qaeda hijacked four commercial airplanes, one was crashed into the Pentagon, two 
were crashed into the World Trade Center, and one never reached its target, due to the 
heroic actions of the passengers on board. This attack left nearly 3,000 people dead, and 
thousands more injured. The death toll for this attack was higher than that of Pearl Harbor 
(“The 9/11 Commission Report: Executive Summary”). On September 20, 2001, 
President George W. Bush declared, “our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does 
not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped and defeated” ("President Bush Addresses the Nation" 2001) and with that the 
War on Terror began. The War on Terror was met with great public support, over half of 
Americans thought that terrorism should be the focus of US foreign policy and 87% of 
Americans approved of President Bush’s handling of the war on terror in the months 
following its conception (Gallup 2001).  
The focus of American foreign policy was now directed at terrorist organizations 
and the countries whence they originate. One of the tools to combat terrorism has been 
foreign assistance of two types: socio-economic1 and military aid. The former aims to 
address the root causes of terrorism by focusing on improving the socio-economic 
conditions of the recipient country. This aid helps finance and develop such areas as 
health care, education, justice systems, infrastructure, etc. The latter is designed to fight 
terrorism with force and manifests as military operations in a recipient country. “Military 
 




assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient 
government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military 
capability” (USAID 2018). 
Much research debates whether aid in fact has the intended (or rather, proclaimed) 
effects (e.g., Bapat 2005; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009, 2010). When it comes to 
measuring the impacts of economic and military aid on terrorism, scholars have shown 
that, ultimately, military aid is ineffective (Kalina 2012, Jenkins 2011, Atwan 2012, 
Kilhoffer 2016), and that economic aid is more likely to reduce terrorist activity (de Ree 
and Nillesen 2009, Kilhoffer 2016). There is also evidence that counterterrorism/military 
aid is failing to achieve its objectives and, in some cases, is counterproductive (e.g., Udoh 
et al. 2019, Bapat 2012, Boutton 2014, Boutton 2019, Kilhoffer 2016, Kim et al. 2019, 
Meierrieks et al. 2020).  
This thesis takes on the question of how foreign assistance influences terrorism by 
focusing on two peculiar empirical regularities: 1) most countries receive US aid for long 
spells of time and 2) most countries receive both military aid and socio-economic aid 
simultaneously. This is why this research asks: 1) how economic and military types of aid 
influence terrorism over time, and 2) whether and how economic aid and military types 
of aid interact with each other to shape terrorist activity in recipient countries.  
My argument is that both military and economic types of aid have the potential to 
be effective counterterrorism tools, however, their respective effects may vary over time: 
socio-economic aid will likely reduce terrorist activity in the long-term as it alleviates 
grievances within the population that boost recruitment by extremist organizations, 




targets to terrorist groups who feel a loss of power as economic aid strengthens 
government and citizen relations. Military aid suppresses militant organizations in the 
short-term through “decapitation,” cutting off logistic support, and making groups rethink 
their strategies. These are expected to reduce the number of terrorist attacks that originate 
from the recipient country. On the other hand, military aid may propel long-term 
recruitment by terrorist organizations, leading to more terrorist attacks in the future. This 
counterproductive effect stems from the nature of militarized response to nonstate actors 
that military aid funds: indiscriminate attacks on civilians aggrieve the population, 
seeding anger and need for revenge, and, in turn, alleviating recruitment into terrorist 
organizations. 
To test my argument, I analyze time-series cross-sectional data on U.S economic 
and military aid and terrorist activity during 1946 – 2010 across 142 countries. My key 
findings include: 1) in the models with country-level fixed effects, aid has no systematic 
effect on terrorism, 2) when considering the impact of economic aid on terrorism, when 
no military aid is provided, economic aid in the previous year is associated with a modest 
increase in terrorism, while economic aid provided in the previous 7 to 10 years is 
associated with a modest reduction in terrorism. These results supply the US policy 
makers with better evidence for allocating aid, thereby increasing the security of the US 
as well as that of recipient nations. While the evidence presented here cautions the US 
policymakers against considering aid as panacea from terrorism, it also emphasizes that if 
local partners are committed to lowering civilian casualties (in my analyses this is 
indicated by the absence of military aid, but this could also be achieved through better 




LITERATURE REVIEW  
Determinants of Terrorism  
Fighting a war on terror is easier said than done, because causes of terrorism vary 
by context. Members of terrorist organizations may come from all backgrounds: from the 
uneducated and deprived to the well-educated and privileged elites. Furthermore, all 
types of political regimes may produce terrorists: from democracies to autocracies (Lia 
and Skjølberg 2000). These probabilities are not equally distributed, however. An 
average terrorist operative is of average or even higher socio-economic background 
(Bjorgo 2005, Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Benmelech et al. 2012), while unintuitive, this 
happens because unemployment and economic struggles increase more individuals will 
turn to terrorism and terrorists will screen and select the most competent individuals to 
join their organizations (Bueno de Mesquita 2005, Benmelech et al. 2012). 
While terrorist on the individual level are more often from the upper socio-
economic levels, as groups they are most often from countries with lower economic 
development (Krueger and Malečková 2003), unstable governments, or from ethnic 
groups that have been politically discriminated against (Choi and Piazza 2016, Crenshaw 
1981). While democracies are less likely to foster domestic terrorism, they are more 
likely than other regimes to be targets of transnational terrorism because of the types of 
foreign policy they pursue (Savun and Phillips 2009). However, in an article from the 
ISIS propaganda magazine Dabiq, they clearly state that foreign policy is a secondary 
reason for their hatred of the west, the primary reason lies in religious ideologies (ISIS 
2018). 




material gains but by moral and abstract ideals (Ginges 2019); furthermore, sacred values 
and religion play a significant role in motivating political violence. Especially seen in 
suicide terrorism, channeling deeply held religious beliefs allows terrorist organizations 
to create a community of tight knit, kin-like believers who are willing to live, fight, and 
die (Atran 2010, Atran 2003) to stand against the “humiliation of globalization” (Stern 
2014). There are many who have been disenfranchised by globalization religiously, 
economically, and often even physically, and terrorism can be used as a tool to regain 
dignity among this embarrassment and regain a “lost sense of personal significance” 
(Stern 2014, Kruglanski et al. 2009). Terrorism is based on ideology (Desker and 
Achyara 2006), those who become terrorists do so because they want to avenge the 
injustices they see in their communities (Crenshaw 1981, Krueger and Laitin 2003). 
Krueger and Laitin (2003) referred to this as the “Robin Hood effect” and it helps explain 
why the economically prosperous are often targets of terrorist attacks (Abadie 2004, 
Krueger and Laitin 2003, Krueger and Malečková 2003). 
Effects of Foreign Aid 
Because of the multi-cause nature of terrorism, it is difficult to pinpoint the roots 
(Newman 2006) to combat it. Traditionally, there are two ways used to combat terrorism, 
being “tough on terrorism,” through military aid, or being “tough on the causes of 
terrorism,” through economic aid (Bird et al. 2008).  The literature most often focuses on 
the short-term effects of these types of aid, there is a large gap in the long-term effects of 








Table 1  
Literature Summary Regarding the Short- and Long-Term Effects of Aid on Terrorism 
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to influence the behavior of a 











Economic Aid  
Socio-economic disparities are fuel to the fire of disenfranchisement (Piazza 
2011). Throughout the 20th century the IRA, the Irish Republican Army, was 
disillusioned by the treatment of the Irish by the British. The lack of jobs, poverty of the 
Irish, and desired freedom provoked the IRA to look to terrorism to prove their point. 
Between 1969 and 1994, it was estimated that they killed nearly 1,800 people (Cowell-
Meyers and Arthur 2019).  However, this effect is not immediate. There are five main 
theories that explain the effects that economic aid has on terrorism (Weintraub 2016). 
First is the information theory which explains that as economic aid is distributed citizens 
begin to share information with the government about terrorist organizations, this in turn 
creates an immediate increase in political violence as terrorist organizations lose control 
of citizens (Berman et al. 2011, Crost et al 2016, Khanna and Zimmerman 2017). Second 
is predation theory that explains the increase in terrorist activity in the short run as 
terrorists use violence to capture and loot aid distributors in order to gain more supplies 
when the economy is performing poorly (Dube and Vargas 2013, Wood and Sullivan 
2015, Bates et al. 2002). Next is the mechanism of preemptively using violence to stop 
anticipated shifts in support, which is when terrorist organizations preventatively 
sabotage economic development projects in order to reduce shifts in civilian support 
(Crost et al. 2014). Fourth is the opportunity cost theory, which posits that economic aid 
increases the cost of joining an insurgency and therefore decreases terrorism in the long 
run (Grossman 1991). The final theory is the “hearts and minds” position, which 
theorizes that aid generates positive feelings towards donors and weakens support for 






and Young 2007). The literature has shown that it takes time for the economic aid to 
accomplish its goals, and while it has proven to reduce terrorism in the long run, in the 
short run it can increase terrorism, which is why I review, first, the immediate impacts of 
this type of aid, then focus on the long-term. 
Short-Term Effects 
In the immediate years following economic aid distribution there is most often an 
increase in terrorist activity consistent with the short-run based theories of information 
sharing, predation, and preemptive violence. It is important to note, however, that aid is 
not allocated randomly: while the evidence discussed below indicates that it is plausible 
that economic aid induces terrorist attacks immediately after its distribution, one should 
be careful when claiming causality between economic aid and terrorism, because 
countries with instability are more likely to receive aid (Findley 2018).  
Especially since the declaration of the War on Terror there has been an increase in 
attacks on humanitarian workers (Fast 2010). Consistent with the predation and 
preemptive strike mechanisms, areas receiving socio-economic aid are more likely to 
become targets of terrorism to intimidate locals from working with the government and to 
dissuade governments from working in that area (Nemeth and Mauslein 2017). Multiple 
terrorist organizations have expressed their disdain for the distributors of socio-economic 
aid. A member of Al Qaeda shared this sentiment in a propaganda magazine, writing, 
“…you must cease all interference in the religion, society, politics, economy, and 
government of the Islamic world. This means putting an immediate stop to the 
deployment of your economic hitmen, CIA Jackals, Peace Corps volunteers, US Aid 






together represent the vanguard of American interference in our region and the world” 
(Al Qaeda Inspire magazine 2010). Khanna and Zimmermann’s analysis of one of the 
world’s largest anti-poverty programs, India’s NREG, also showed that humanitarian aid 
can increase violence on civilians in the short run as terrorists attempt regain lost power 
as citizens begin to share more information with the government (Weintraub 2016, 
Khanna and Zimmerman 2017, Zürcher 2017). However, in the long run economic aid 
can be effective at combatting terrorism. (Berman 2011, Crost 2014)  
Long-Term Effects2 
The hearts and mind and opportunity cost theories, by contrast, proffer that 
economic aid is helpful in reducing terrorism in the long run. There have been findings 
that socio-economic aid in fields such as health, unemployment, education, conflict 
prevention, and labor market programs can reduce terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks 
2010, Young and Findley 2011), as terrorist organizations often use such social services 
as tools to gain community support and recruit more members (Gaibulloev and Sandler 
2019).  
However, some have argued that aid of this type is ineffective and may even stunt 
the growth of democracy (Djankov et al. 2008, Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009). This is 
because the effectiveness of aid is significantly lower when aid is granted for political 
reasons (Dreher et al. 2014), and humanitarian aid is rarely motivated by altruism, but 
nearly always by political motives and donor self-interest, especially since 9/11 (Bueno 
 
2 Though most of this data is not explicitly analyzed to find the long-term results (see 
Table 1), they are analyzing programs that do ultimately affect communities in the long 






de Mesquita and Smith 2009, Hoeffler 2011, Miles 2012). However, even with the 
ulterior motives decreasing the effectiveness, there is evidence that economic aid is an 
important tool in helping a country move from war economy to peace economy (Hoeffler 
2012, Goodhand 2010), and in turn terrorism.  
Böhnke and Zürcher (2013) find that while aid does not always increase positive 
attitudes towards donor countries or increase feelings of security it does increase the 
legitimacy of the state. When a state is unable to provide for its citizens potential rebels 
and insurgents gain bargaining strength and there is an increase of armed conflict and 
violence (Savun and Tirone 2012, Nielsen et al 2011). Economic aid can help to fill in the 
gaps where states cannot provide for their citizens and alleviate some of the tension 
between the people and the government.  When socio-economic tensions exist, it 
increases the chances of insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003) but increased foreign aid 
can decrease the duration or chances of civil conflict (de Ree and Nillesen 2009). This is 
significant because overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks occur within the context of 
civil wars or insurgencies (Stanton 2013, Findley and Young 2012), as terrorism and 
civilian targeting is seen as an effective military tactic for rebel groups (Feldmann 2018, 
Kalyvas 2004, Wood 2010). 
Military Aid   
Short-Term Effects3 
Military aid appears to reduce terrorism in the short run (Kilhoffer 2016), but not 
 
3 There has been much research done on the effects on military aid on terrorism. Most 
often scholars focus on the long-term and negative effects that military aid has on 
terrorism (See Table 1: Short- and Long-Term Literature Analysis). The military aid 
literature is lacking in its analysis of short-term effects on terrorism. Because of this gap 






in the long term (Waśko–Owsiejczuk 2016). It is a more direct way of fighting terrorism 
and it may bring immediate results in the fight against terrorism as it helps disrupt 
sources of financing and logistical support for organizations (Waśko–Owsiejczuk 2016), 
and capturing and killing leaders of terrorist groups may cause disillusionment of recruits 
and a need to reevaluate leadership and strategies (Burke 2004), but it does not ultimately 
stop terrorist activity. In a short-term study on the effects of targeted and indiscriminate 
violence as counterterrorism, Benmelech et al. (2014) found that targeted violence is an 
effective preventive tool for terrorism in the first 5 years (Benmelech et al. 2014). After 
the death of Osama Bin Laden in May of 2011, there was not a terrorist attack directed by 
Al Qaeda until the In Amenas hostage situation in 2013 (Chrisafis et al. 2013) two years 
later. Successful drone strikes may reduce terrorist activity (Jaeger and Siddique 2018). 
In an analysis of drone strikes in Pakistan, Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) found that in the 
week of a drone strike there was a decrease in terrorist incidents (Johnston and Sarbahi 
2016). Another case study of organized crime in Mexico found that decapitation was 
successful in the short run, but not the long (Phillips 2015). Decapitations are only 
successful if the organization has a weak bureaucracy and little communal support 
(Jordan 2014).  
Long-Term Effects 
When countries receive military aid, there it may result in a reduction in terrorist 
activity as it leads to decapitation and changes in terrorist tactics (Chrisafis et al. 2013, 
Zech 2016). However, it has not been found to reduce the ability of groups to generate 
propaganda and recruit new members (Smith and Walsh 2016). Terrorists succeed when 
 






governments react to their violence with more violence (Findley and Young 2012), 
counter terrorist actions may end up increasing “radicalization and social polarization” 
and lock the country into a vicious cycle of violence rather than eradicating terrorism 
(Schneider et al. 2014). As counter terrorist aid impedes on basic human rights, such as 
privacy, it creates a reverse effect and increases terrorist activity (Udoh et al. 2019).  
For these reasons, in the long run, military aid is ineffective at stopping terrorism, 
(Kalina 2012, Jenkins 2011, Atwan 2012) and may even result in an increase in terrorist 
activity as it removes the incentive for regimes to actually fight terrorism (Bapat 2012, 
Boutton 2014, Boutton 2019, Kilhoffer 2016, Kim et al. 2019, Meierrieks et al. 2020) and 
does more to create feelings of anger and marginalization (Kellner 2002).  Terrorism 
increases when military aid increases (Dimant et al. 2010, Jadoon 2019) especially when 
the aid includes the exporting of weapons or the deployment of troops (Du Bois and Buts 
2014). “If countries are to win the war on terror, they must eradicate enemies without 
creating new ones” (Burke 2004), and military aid is not always an effective way of 
doing that. US military presence creates feelings of “apprehension and hostility and fear” 
(Pfaff 2010) that fuel terroristic motives (Stern 2020).  
Military and Economic Aid  
To summarize the preceding sections, both types of aid are effective at reducing 
terrorism in some ways, and ineffective in other ways (Kilhoffer 2016). Ultimately, in the 
long run it is economic aid that is more effective at reducing terrorism than military aid, 
because it addresses the roots of terrorism (Findley et al. 2011).  
The literature has addressed the effects of the different types of aid (although the 






military aid tend to have different effects on terrorism. Most of scholarship tends to 
analyze the effects of military and economic aid, focusing on one or the other. The 
literature also often fails to recognize the differences between the two types of aid and 
simply lumps them into one “foreign aid” category (e.g. Azam and Thelen 2006, Azam 
and Thelen 2010,  Bandyopahyay et al. 2010) with little regard to the different effects the 
aids have on terrorism. Some authors (e.g., Findley, 2018 or Boutton, 2019) will initially 
discuss the two types of aid, but ultimately fail to show the interaction between them.  
Others have found that the militarization of humanitarian aid may lead to an 
increase in terrorism (Bristol 2006), or that US foreign policy tends to focus on military 
aid rather than economic aid (Liu et al. 2019). Gries et al. (2014) found that both 
economic and military dependence on the US may cause an increase in anti-American 
terrorist attacks within a short time period and a longer time period, respectively.  
This study will examine the short- and long-term effects of each type of aid on 
terrorism originating in the recipient country. Few papers have done this (see Table 1).  It 
will also measure the effect of military aid conditional on economic aid provisions to a 
country in the short- and in the long-term, and vice versa. The US rarely gives only one 
type of aid, so it is important to test if these two types interact with one another and what 







Competing Time Varying Effects of Military and Economic Aid  
The scholarship has implied, but not tested that military aid and socio-economic 
aid have opposite effects on terrorism. This section argues why—based on the intuition 
developed by prior scholars—we should expect that military aid reduces terrorism in the 
short term but is also likely to create a backlash that could drive more terrorism in the 
long term. Whereas, socio-economic aid is likely to increase terrorism in the short term 
but has the potential to solve the underlying grievances—thus, reducing terrorism—in the 
long term.  
Table 2 
 Hypothesized Short- and Long-Term Effects of Aid on Terrorism 
 
Short-Term Effect Long-Term Effect 
Solely Economic Aid  
Increase in terrorist Activity 
(Aid projects become targets of 
terrorism) 
Decrease in Terrorist Activity 
(Socioeconomic grievances are 
resolved) 
Solely Military Aid 
Decrease in Terrorist Activity 
(Suppresses logistical support and 
decapitates organizations) 
Increase in Terrorist Activity 
(Targeting of civilians creates more 
grievances) 
Both Types of Aid 
Stagnation of Terrorist Activity 
(The effects cancel each other out) 
  
As military aid takes effect in a recipient country there is a short-term setback in 
the amount of terrorist activity in that country, as the terrorist organization loses 
manpower, infrastructure, leaders, or begins to factionalize (Jones 2009, Zech 2016). 
Tactics such as decapitation have been proven to be effective at ending terrorist 






in the long run. The causal mechanisms for long-term effects of military aid are 
blowback, and feelings of anger and resentment that fuel terrorist organizations, this 
results in an increase in terrorist organization strength and activity (Johnson 2000). 
“Military force...alienates the local population by its heavy-handed nature and provides a 
window of opportunity for terrorist-group recruitment” (Jones and Libicki 2008). The 
terrorist attack on Pan Am flight 103 on December 21, 1988 that killed 270 people was in 
retaliation to a US bombing campaign of the Libyan capital (“Pan Am 103 Bombing | 
Federal Bureau of Investigation”, “Pan Am Flight 103 | Overview, Crash, Victims, & 
Facts | Britannica”, Johnson 2000).  
The short term-term causal mechanisms for economic aid are that it creates targets 
for terrorist groups and that it threatens the territory and power of organizations. Often 
terrorist groups will engage in charitable activities in order to gain public support (Ly 
2007). After an earthquake in Algeria in 1989 the Islamic Salvation Front gained public 
support by responding to the crisis and distributing relief more effectively and quickly 
than the government (St. John 1996, Ly 2007). By giving economic aid the US 
encroaches on the sphere of power set by terrorist organizations and creates animosity 
towards not only the US, but also local governments (Weintraub 2016, Khanna and 
Zimmerman 2017, Zürcher 2017). In recent years attacks on humanitarian workers have 
increased (Fast 2010, “Total Incidents by Country (1997-2019) | Aid Worker Security 
Database”, Dawson 2014). In Afghanistan, in 2016, there were 24 attacks on 
humanitarian workers distributing socio-economic aid from the UN, multiple countries 
and NGOs around the world. In Sudan, there were 52 workers attacked (Aid Worker 






aid are the opposite, they fight terrorism from the roots and help to reduce the feelings of 
anger and resentment that fuel terrorist organizations, as the literature has proved.  
 In summary, military aid may reduce terrorism through force, while socio-
economic aid may reduce it by addressing the social needs of the recipients. However, the 
combination of both types of aid will likely prolong the amount of time it will take to 
defeat terrorism, because of the dampening effect they have on one another. If there is 
socio-economic aid in the area it will become the target of the terrorist organizations, 
who are more than ever in need of supplies and money and need to maintain their 
monopoly on resources and stability. This means that the socio-economic aid will not 
reach its designated benefactors, and will not only benefit the terrorist organization, but it 
will more importantly not fight the roots of terrorism. This means that the positive long-
term effects that socio-economic aid may have on fighting the roots of terrorism will now 
take longer to take hold and the feelings of disenfranchisement in the community will 
continue. As this feeling of marginalization continues to exist terrorist organizations will 
be able to thrive on the feelings of resentment that blowback (from the military aid) and 
continued socio-economic problems create. This leads not only to an increased amount of 
terrorist activity in the short-term, but a long-term consequence of an increased lifespan 
for terrorist organizations.  
Hypotheses  
This study will evaluate three expectations. The first hypothesis will verify 
systematically the intuition implied by the economic aid literature, which has shown that 
economic aid correlates with increases in terrorism in the short run (e.g. Fast 2010, 






long run (e.g. Berman 2011, Crost 2014, Young and Findley 2011). The 
operationalizations of aid and terrorist activity vary between these groups of works, my 
contribution, thus, lies in re-evaluating this expectation, using consistent measures of 
both aid and terrorism across time.  
H1A: Economic aid is associated with short-term growth in terrorism. 
H1B: Economic aid is associated with long-term decline in terrorism. 
The second hypothesis verifies the intuition from the military aid literature which 
has done little research on the long-term effects of military aid on terrorism but has 
focused much of its attention on the short-term effects on terrorism. Based on 
decapitation and military action literature, it is expected that military aid will initially 
create a lull in terrorist activity (e.g. Waśko–Owsiejczuk 2016, Burke 2004, Phillips 
2015, Jordan 2014), however much evidence points in favor of military aid fostering 
terrorism down the road (e.g. Bapat 2012, Boutton 2014, Boutton 2019, Kilhoffer 2016, 
Kim et al. 2019, Meierrieks et al. 2020). This study’s contribution is in evaluating this 
expectation relying on consistent measures of both aid and terrorism across time.  
H2A: Military aid is associated with short-term decline in terrorism.  
H2B: Military aid is associated with long-term growth in terrorism. 
My third hypothesis focuses on the opposite impacts that the two types of aid 
generate that counter the other. The above stated effects on terrorism are expected in the 
absence of the other type of aid. If only economic aid were present, one would expect that 
after an immediate increase in terrorism, terrorist organizations would become less and 
less active. If only military aid were present, one would expect a continual resurgence of 






population. With both types of aid present, it is expected that the short-term effects of 
military aid will reduce terrorism and the effects of economic aid will increase terrorism. 
In the long run, economic aid will be reducing the feelings of resentment, but military aid 
will be creating feelings of resentment. This will create a stagnation of terrorist activity in 
both the short and long run. When both types of aid are present in a country, they interact 
with one another. As the ratio of military to economic aid approaches 1 the effects of 
each type cancel the other out. But the more one type of aid exceeds the other, the closer 
the observed patterns are expected to follow those described in hypotheses 1A, 1B, 2A, 
and 2B.  
H3A: When both types of aid are present, the more economic aid exceeds the level 
of military aid, the more its impact on terrorism should follow the patterns 
outlined in hypotheses 1A and 1B. 
H3B: When both types of aid are present, the more military aid exceeds the level of 
economic aid, the more its impact on terrorism should follow the patterns 
outlined in hypotheses 2A and 2B. 
H3c: When both types of aid are present, the more balanced the two types of aid 








To empirically test my expectations, I rely on the data from Boutton (2019). 
These data allow for a cross-sectional time-series analysis of U.S. economic and military 




The data on terrorist attacks come from the Global Terrorism Database. They 
define terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-
state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, 
or intimidation” (START, 2012). This database contains information on the location, 
year, and target of over 80,0000 terrorist attacks in nearly 200 countries from 1970 to 
2012. The main dependent variable of interest is Total Attacksit. For robustness, I will 
also analyze US and Non-US targeted attacks, as well as logged indicators of each type of 
attack. As can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 the data is heavily right skewed, the logged 
variables attempt to normalize the distribution and allow for more appropriate statistical 
analysis of the data. This results in six measures that capture the amount of terrorism in 

































Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 





Total Attacks 0 27.71 7849 179.64 9955 
Total Attacks 
(Logged) 
0 0.85 8.97 1.57 9955 
US Targeted Attacks 0 0.37 354 4.45 9955 
US Targeted Attacks 
(Logged) 
0 0.06 5.87 0.34 9955 
Non-US Targeted 
Attacks 
0 13.67 3924 88.99 9955 
Non-US Targeted 
Attacks (Logged) 
0 0.61 8.27 1.33 9955 
 
Independent Variables  
The data on both US military and economic aid are available from 1946 to 2014. 
As Figure 5 demonstrates, the distribution of aid is extremely right skewed. I address this 
problem by using the natural log of aid indicators (logged distributions are shown in 
Figure 6), as is common in the literature (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 
Boutton 2014). To test the short- and long-term effect of the US aid I lagged the aid 
variables by 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years.  I consider 1 to 3 years short term, and 5, 7 and years 








 Figure 3 















Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 Minimum Mean Maximum Standard Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
Economic Aid (Logged) 0 12.29 24.23 7.64 9581 
Economic Aidt-1 (Logged) 0 12.29 24.23 7.64 9578 
Economic Aidt-3 (Logged) 0 12.24 24.23 7.67 9385 
Economic Aidt-5 (Logged) 0 12.12 24.23 7.74 9006 
Economic Aidt-7 (Logged) 0 11.99 24.23 7.81 8628 
Economic Aidt-10 (Logged) 0 11.83 24.23 7.89 8062 
Military Aid (Logged) 0 7.93 23.36 7.74 9581 
Military Aidt-1 (Logged) 0 7.93 23.36 7.74 9578 
Military Aidt-3 (Logged) 0 7.88 23.36 7.75 9385 
Military Aid t-5 (Logged) 0 7.73 23.36 7.76 9006 
Military Aid t-7 (Logged) 0 7.59 23.36 7.79 8628 
Military Aid t-10 (Logged) 0 7.39 23.36 7.81 8062 
 
Military Aid  
Military aid consists of foreign military financing, boots on the ground, loans, 
grants, and training programs, “Anti-Terrorism Assistance (the State Department’s 
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs,) Department of 
Defense Security Assistance, and Defense Department funding under sections 1206 and 
1207” (Boutton 2019). Section 1206 and 1207 are funding programs that began in 2007. 





forces for...counterterrorism and stability operations—and foreign security forces for 
counterterrorism operations” (Serafino 2014).  
The data for military aid were recorded by Boutton from the United States 
Agency for International Development’s Greenbook, with the exception of the Defense 
Department data which was not included in the Greenbook.  
Economic Aid  
US economic aid consists of humanitarian and socio-economic aid. It consists of 
grants, loans, and humanitarian donations. This information is taken from the USAID 
Greenbook. The Greenbook contains data from 192 countries from 1946 to 2014 
(Boutton 2019, Greenbook 2020).  
Control Variables  
 There are many confounding factors that may potentially affect both receiving US 
aid and the incidence of terrorism: political regime, GDP, civil war, population size, 
interstate rivalry, media, and whether or not the aid was given during the Cold War or 
post 9/11. To account for these, I use the same control variables that Boutton used in his 
2019 analysis. All control variables, apart from media score, post-9/11, and Cold War, 












Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 





Personalist Regimet-1 0 1 0 0.15 0.36 7552 
Democracyt-1 0 1 0 0.32 0.47 9610 
Military Regimet-1 0 1 0 0.08 0.26 7552 
GDPt-1 (logged) 3.96 11.84 8.22 8.24 1.34 7588 
Populationt-1 (logged) 11.29 21.02 15.81 15.76 1.64 8718 
Civil Wart-1 0 1 0 0.14 0.35 9612 
Interstate Rivalryt-1 0 1 0 0.31 0.46 9049 
Media Score 0 8 3 2.58 1.17 8951 
Post 9/11 0 1 0 0.25 0.43 9799 
Cold War 0 1 1 0.54 0.49 9799 
 
Regime Type 
Regime type has been shown to impact terrorist activity as per Boutton (2019). To 
control for this, I follow Boutton in using three separate dummy variables: democracy, 
personalist regime, and military regime. Political regimes are on a binomial scale that 
reflect whether a country is (1) or is not (0) a particular regime type.  
GDP Per Capita 
Wealthier states are less likely to experience domestic terrorism (Krueger and 
Malečková 2003). To account for this Boutton uses data on GDP per capita from 
Maddison (2012).  
Civil Wars 
Most terrorist attacks occur within the context of civil wars (Stanton 2013, 
Findley and Young 2011). Boutton uses a dichotomous variable, with 0 representing 
internal peace and 1 showing engagement in a civil war using data from the USDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset (Themner and Wallensteen 2012).  In order to be counted as a 





calendar year” (Wallensteen 2018).   
Controlling for civil conflict is the most important way of accounting for the 
nonrandom allocation of US aid in this study. Consider for instance, the patterns of US 
aid allocation and terrorism in Afghanistan. From 1985 to 2001, Afghanistan received 
solely economic aid from the United States, during this time there were 151 terrorist 
attacks, 4% of those were on US Citizens.4 In 2002, after the 2001 invasion of 
Afghanistan, the United States began to provide Afghanistan with military aid along with 
economic aid. This is the period of the Taliban insurgency that uses terrorist attacks to 
combat the US presence. By 2010 there had been 7613 attacks, 11% of those were 
directed at US citizens (START 2018).  
Consider Figure 2 that charts amounts of aid and terrorist attacks in Afghanistan 
over time. The endogeneity of aid and terrorism is obvious in this case, which is why all 
indicators of aid are lagged and the civil war is controlled for.  
 
4 While it is also true that the US supported the Mujahideen militarily, aid to support 






Foreign Aid and Terrorism in Afghanistan 
Figure 6 






There is also a correlation between population size and terrorist activity, where 
more populous countries experience more terrorist attacks (Wilson and Piazza 2013). To 
control for this a natural log of country population has been included. The data was taken 
from the World Bank (2014).  
Interstate Rivalry 
Evidence has also shown that states involved in interstate rivalries will experience 
an increase in terrorism (Boutton 2014). The data for this control is taken from 
Thompson and Dreyer (2011). It is represented by a dichotomous variable, with 1 
representing a country engaged in interstate rivalry, and 0 representing countries not 
engaged in interstate rivalry.   
Media Freedom 
A measure of media freedom has been taken from Whitten-Woodring and Belle 
(2014) to control for any effect that underreporting biases may have on the count of 
terrorist attacks (Boutton 2019).  This data is shown on a scale of 1 to 8, with 1 
representing the most freedom of the press and 8 representing the least freedom of the 
press.  
Time-Period Indicators 
 Two time-period indicators have been added as two separate dummy variables. 
These were added because terrorism could have been affected by the end of the Cold 
War. This is time period was a volatile time for state sponsorship behavior (Pillar 2004, 
Byman 2005), and may have affected the use of terrorism (Boutton 2019). The other 
time-period indicator is added to reflect the prominence of terrorism globally after the 






 An OLS regression is not appropriate for my dependent variables, because of the 
right skew in the distributions of attacks and the dependent variable having a theoretical 
value of zero, implying that predicted values cannot be negative. The variance in this data 
is also much greater than the mean. For these reasons, a negative binomial count model is 
more appropriate for these data. I have tested the significance of the overdispersion 
parameter alpha in all estimated models (details are provided under each table); it is 
statistically different from zero in almost all estimated models, which is why we reject 
Poisson in favor of negative binomial regression for these data, in some models, the 
parameter was not statistically discernible from 0, which is why I reran those models with 
Poisson estimator, which did not alter my results.  
 Additionally, countries receive different amounts of aid, some receiving exorbitant 
amounts and others receiving minimal amounts, and this fluctuates across time; not all of 
reasons for different amounts of aid are captured by the observable attributes included as 
controls in the models. To account for the unobserved country-specific effects, fixed 
effects for individual countries are included, as well, in models reported in Tables 7, 9, 







In this section I analyze the effects of military and economic aid on terrorism 
across 142 countries from 1970 to 2012 using a negative binomial count model. I control 
for regime type, GDP, population, interstate rivalry, civil war, and whether the attacks 
happened before or after the Cold War or 9/11 to test my hypotheses.  
Analysis of Logged Count Model with 1-Year Lag 
Tables 6 and 7 (country-level fixed effects) present the incidence rate ratios from 
the negative binomial regressions that estimate the impact of logged economic and 
military aid on terrorist attacks lagged by one year.   
• Figure 7 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 1 of Table 6: 
when we do not control for country-level fixed effects, both economic and 
military aid lagged by 1 year are positively associated with total attacks 
when the other type of aid is at the mean level. 
• Figure 8 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 3 of Table 6: 
when we do not control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, both 
types of aid lagged by 1 year are positively associated with attacks on US 
targets when the other aid is at average level. 
• Figure 9 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 7 of Table 7: 
when we control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, both types of 
aid lagged by 1 years generate statistically significant effects on total 
attacks (holding the other type of aid is at average level). With military aid 





at its mean, and economic aid showing a slight increase in terrorism, when 
military aid is held at its mean.  
• Controls: all results are consistent with prior literature except for:  
- Increases in GDP are associated with more terrorism, which 
contradicts finding that wealthier states are less likely they are to 
experience domestic terrorist attacks (Krueger and Malečková 2003). 








Logged Aidt-1 and Terrorism Count Model 































































































































































































Number of Observations 6,497 6,497 6,497 6,497 6,497 6,497 
2 x Log Likelihood -30,981.87 -15,669.45 -7,158.79 -3,167.88 -26,142.40 -12,681.78 
AIC 31,011.87 15,699.44 7,188.79 3,197.88 26,172.40 12,711.78 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.50 0.75 9.64 3.67 5.50 1.00 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically 









Conditional Effects of Logged Aidt-1 on Terrorist Attacks 
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 










Figure 8  
Conditional Effects of Logged Aidt-1 on US Targeted Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 







Logged Aidt-1 and Terrorism Count Model with CFE  































































































































































































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 
2 x Log Likelihood -28,255.99 -13,095.38 -5,962.31 -2,393.19 -23,166.88 -10,225.36 
AIC 28,567.99 13,407.38 6,274.31 2,705.19 23,478.88 10,537.36 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.27 0.23 0.34 0.19 0.31 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.16 0.03 3.19 0.57 2.36 0.03 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are 
all statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 8 and 12. Re-estimating models 8 and 12 with a Poisson 










Figure 9  
Conditional Effect of Logged Aidt-1 on Terrorist Attacks with CFE 
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean 
level controlling for inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of logged military aid on total targeted terrorism holding 





Analysis of Logged Count Model with 3-Year Lag 
Tables 8 and 9 (country-level fixed effects) present the incidence rate ratios from 
the negative binomial regressions that estimate the impact of logged economic and 
military aid on terrorist attacks lagged by three years. All results are similar to those 
described in the previous section:  
• Figure 10 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 13 of Table 8: 
when we do not control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, both 
types of aid lagged by 3 years are positively associated with total attacks 
when the other type of aid is at average level. 
• Figure 11 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 15 of Table 8: 
when we do not control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, 
military aid lagged by 3 years is positively associated with attacks on US 
targets when economic aid is at average level. 
• Figure 12 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 18 of Table 9: 
when we control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, bother types 
of aid lagged by 3 years generate statistically and substantively negligible 
effects on total attacks (holding the other type of aid is at average level). 
• Controls: all results are consistent with prior literature except for:  
- Increases in GDP are associated with more terrorism, which 
contradicts finding that wealthier states are less likely they are to 
experience domestic terrorist attacks (Krueger and Malečková 2003). 






Logged Aidt-3 and Terrorism Count Model  































































































































































































Number of Observations 6,432 6,432 6,432 6,432 6,432 6,432 
2 x Log Likelihood -30,787.34 -15,570.94 -7,079.10 -3,164.80 -25,992.79 -12,614.82 
AIC 30,817.34 15,600.94 7,109.10 3,194.80 26,022.79 12,644.81 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.52 0.75 8.95 3.60 5.52 1.00 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically 







Figure 10  
Conditional Effects of Logged Aidt-3 on Terrorist Attacks 
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 









Conditional Effects of Logged Aidt-3 on US Targeted Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 







Logged Aidt-3 and Terrorism Count Model with CFE  































































































































































































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 6432 6432 6432 6432 6432 6432 
2 x Log Likelihood -28,096.88 -13,013.00 -5,932.17 -2,382.88 -25,053.18 -10,167.78 
AIC 28,408.88 13,325.00 6,244.17 2,694.88 23,365.18 10,479.78 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.27 0.23 0.34 0.19 0.31 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.19 0.03 3.14 0.52 2.38 0.03 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are 
all statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 20 and 24. Re-estimating models 20 and 24 with a Poisson 













Conditional Effect of Logged Aidt-3 on Terrorist Attacks with CFE 
 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean 
level controlling for inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of logged military aid on total targeted terrorism holding 





Analysis of Logged Count Model with 5-Year Lag 
Tables 10 and 11 (country-level fixed effects) present the incidence rate ratios 
from the negative binomial regressions that estimate the impact of logged economic and 
military aid on terrorist attacks lagged by five years. The results of this regression are 
similar to those described in the previous section:  
• Figure 13 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 25 of Table 10: 
where there is no control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, both 
types of aid lagged by 5 years are positively associated with total attacks 
when the other type of aid is at average level. 
• Figure 14 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 27 of Table 10: 
when we do not control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, 
military aid lagged by 5 years is positively associated with attacks on US 
targets when economic aid is at average level. 
• Figure 15 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 31 of Table 11: 
when we control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, both types of 
aid lagged by 5 years generate statistically and substantively negligible 
effects on total attacks (holding the other type of aid is at average level). 
• Controls: all results are consistent with prior literature except for:  
- Increases in GDP are associated with more terrorism, which contradicts 
finding that wealthier states are less likely they are to experience 
domestic terrorist attacks (Krueger and Malečková 2003). My results 






Logged Aidt-5 and Terrorism Count Model  































































































































































































Number of Observations 6,316 6,316 6,316 6,316 6,316 6,316 
2 x Log Likelihood -30,449.68 -15,389.19 -7,040.56 -3,164.19 -25,717.24 -12,478.05 
AIC 30,479.68 15,419.19 7,070.56 3,194.19 25,747.24 12,508.05 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.61 0.74 9.13 4.16 5.59 0.98 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically 










Conditional Effects of Logged Aidt-5 on Terrorist Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 











Figure 14  
Conditional Effects of Logged Aidt-5 on US Targeted Terrorist Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 








Logged Aidt-5 and Terrorism Count Model with CFE  































































































































































































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 6316 6316 6316 6316 6316 6316 
2 x Log Likelihood -27,819.89 -12,868.66 -5,897.01 -2,389.42 -22,837.18 -10,058.18 
AIC 28,131.89 13,180.66 6,209.01 2,701.42 23,149.18 10,370.18 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.27 0.23 0.34 0.19 0.31 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.19 0.03 3.22 0.59 2.39 0.03 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are 
all statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 32 and 36. Re-estimating models 32 and 36 with a Poisson 









Conditional Effect of Logged Aidt-5 on Terrorist Attacks with CFE  
 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean 
level controlling for inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of logged military aid on total targeted terrorism 






Analysis of Logged Count Model with 7-Year Lag 
Tables 12 and 13 (country-level fixed effects) present the incidence rate ratios 
from the negative binomial regressions that estimate the impact of logged economic and 
military aid on terrorist attacks lagged by seven years. The results of this regression are 
summarized here:  
• Figure 16 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 37 of Table 12: 
where there is no control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, 
military aid lagged by 7 years is positively associated with total attacks 
when economic aid is at average level. 
• Figure 17 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 39 of Table 12: 
when we do not control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, both 
types of aid lagged by 7 years are positively associated with US targeted 
attacks when the other type of aid is at average level. 
• Figure 18 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 43 of Table 13: 
when we control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, economic 
aid lagged by 7 years is negatively associated with total attacks when 
military aid is held at its average level. 
• Controls: all results are consistent with prior literature except for:  
- Increases in GDP are associated with more terrorism, which contradicts 
finding that wealthier states are less likely they are to experience 
domestic terrorist attacks (Krueger and Malečková 2003). My results 






Logged Aidt-7 and Terrorism Count Model 































































































































































































Number of Observations 6,113 6,113 6,113 6,113 6,113 6,113 
2 x Log Likelihood -30,102.35 -15,164.18 -7,009.87 -3,145.78 -25,433.46 -12,321.78 
AIC 30,132.35 15,194.18 7,039.87 3,175.78 25,463.46 12,351.78 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.46 0.71 9.05 4.09 5.48 0.95 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically 










Conditional Effects of Logged Aidt-7 on Terrorist Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 














Conditional Effects of Logged Aidt-7 on US Targeted Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 







Logged Aidt-7 and Terrorism Count Model with CFE  































































































































































































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations 6113 6113 6113 6113 6113 6113 
2 x Log Likelihood -27,543.02 -12,693.16 -5,863.79 -2,389.68 -22,615.72 -9,935.56 
AIC 27,855.02 13,005.16 6,175.79 1,701.68 22,927.72 10,247.56 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.27 0.23 0.33 0.18 0.31 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.16 0.02 3.21 0.61 2.37 0.02 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are 
all statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 44 and 48. Re-estimating models 44 and 48 with a Poisson 










Figure 18  
Conditional Effect of Logged Aidt-7 on Terrorist Attacks with CFE  
 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean 
level controlling for inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of logged military aid on total targeted terrorism holding 





Analysis of Logged Count Model with 10-Year Lag 
Tables 14 and 15 (country-level fixed effects) present the incidence rate ratios 
from the negative binomial regressions that estimate the impact of logged economic and 
military aid on terrorist attacks lagged by ten years. The results of this regression are 
summarized here:  
• Figure 19 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 49 of Table 14: 
where there is no control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, both 
types of aid lagged by 10 years are positively associated with total attacks 
when the other type of aid is at average level. 
• Figure 20 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 51 of Table 14: 
when we do not control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, both 
types of aid lagged by 10 years are positively associated with US targeted 
attacks when the other type of aid is at average level. 
• Figure 21 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 55 of Table 15: 
when we control for unobserved inter-country heterogeneity, economic 
aid lagged by 10 years is negatively associated with total attacks when 
military aid is at average level. 
• Controls: all results are consistent with prior literature except for:  
- Increases in GDP are associated with more terrorism, which contradicts 
finding that wealthier states are less likely they are to experience 
domestic terrorist attacks (Krueger and Malečková 2003). My results 






Logged Aidt-10 and Terrorism Count Model  































































































































































































Number of Observations 5,784 5,784 5,784 5,784 5,784 5,784 
2 x Log Likelihood -29,416.76 -14,747.71 -6,941.13 -3,109.35 -24,863.69 -12,042.66 
AIC 29,446.76 14,777.71 6,971.13 3,139.35 24,893.69 12,072.66 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.16 0.69 9.42 3.62 5.26 0.93 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically 

















Conditional Effects of Logged Aidt-10 on Terrorist Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 












Figure 20  
Conditional Effects of Logged Aidt-10 on US Targeted Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 







Logged Aidt-10 and Terrorism Count Model with CFE   































































































































































































Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 5784 5784 5784 5784 5784 5784 
2 x Log Likelihood -28,233.13 -12,420.95 -5,796.26 -2,372.22 -22,219.39 -9,776.65 
AIC 27,333.11 12,732.95 6,108.26 2,684.22 22,531.39 10,088.65 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.26 0.22 0.33 0.18 0.30 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.13 0.02 3.13 0.57 2.37 0.02 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are 
all statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 56 and 60. Re-estimating models 56 and 60 with a Poisson 









Conditional Effect of Logged Aidt-10 on Terrorist Attacks with CFE  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean 
level controlling for inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of logged military aid on total targeted terrorism holding 






Summary of Results 
This paper addresses the question of how economic and military aid impact terrorism 
both in the short run (1 to 3 years), and in the long run (5 to 7 to 10 years). Many scholars 
agree that while economic aid projects may create immediate targets of terrorism, they 
help socioeconomic development, impeding future terrorism. By contrast, military aid 
funds counterinsurgency operations that tend to use indiscriminate attacks on civilians, 
thus despite immediate success in suppressing terrorism, such aid breeds grievances and 
helps future recruitment by terrorist organizations. This paper retests these expectations, 
while addressing some of the problems present in prior research:  
a) I use the statistical model that accounts for overdispersion in the data and 
compare models with and without country-level fixed effects. 
b) I use consistent operationalization of aid and terrorism, while also systematically 
varying lagged values of aid indicators. 
c) I interact the two types of aid since most recipients are provided with both types 
of aid. 
This research has exposed the importance of modeling choices when estimating the 
impact of military and economic aid on terrorism. My main finding is that adding 
country-level fixed effects washes out the impact of aid on terrorism. When I consider the 
effects of each type of aid when the other type is absent in the models with fixed effects, 
a pattern broadly consistent with the theoretical expectation of Hypothesis 1 emerges. 





with a modest increase in terrorism, while economic aid provided in the previous 7 to 10 
years is associated with a modest reduction in terrorism. About 40% of country-year 
observations in my data set saw economic aid in the preceding years with no 
accompanying military aid, this is a more common pattern of aid allocation than military 
aid without economic assistance. 
For comparison, without fixed effects, economic aid provided in the preceding 1 to 3 
years is associated with increases in terrorism (at mean levels of military aid), while 
military aid (at mean levels of economic aid) generates increases in terrorism in all lags, 
but especially substantively large increases when using 5 to 10 year lags of military aid 
indicators. Interestingly, none of the model specifications produced a pacifying effect of 
aid on terrorism. However, most conditional effects of aid are substantively and 
statistically negligible after country-level fixed effects are included. In summary, my 
main conclusion is that inter-country heterogeneity not captured by the included control 
variables (standard in the literature) explains much variation in terrorism across the 
world.  
An obvious empirical challenge for this project is the coexistence of civil conflict, 
aid, and terrorism: states experiencing civil conflict are more likely to receive more aid 
and to experience more terrorism. As an additional robustness check, I re-estimated my 
results on a subsample of civil war cases. While some models did not converge, among 
the estimated models with 3-, 5-, and 10-year lagged indicators of aid, the effects of aid 
were substantively and statistically negligible, which further supports the idea that aid 






Limitations and Future Research 
 The United States is not the only country that distributes aid and while US 
patterns of aid do not differ greatly from other OECD countries (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith 2009) a comparative study of US aid versus other OECD countries’ aid would be 
relevant and important. It is also important to recognize that non – OECD countries also 
distribute aid. China and Russia give significant amounts of aid as well (Degterev et al. 
2018, Kitano and Harada 2015). Future research should study the impacts of non-western 
aid on terrorism, as well as do a comparative study, and control for aid that does not 
come from the United States that is most likely being distributed in countries where the 
US is also working.  
 While this cross-national approach is useful in identifying patterns, it aggregates 
both aid and terrorism at the level of nation states, thus potentially missing the cases 
where aid and terrorism (while occurring on the territory of the same state) were 
geographically separated and causally unrelated.  Future research could increase its 
reliance on event-level quantitative data to conduct a series of quantitative case studies to 
reexamine the findings of this paper by estimating whether within-country over-time 
changes in aid shape terrorism, while also accounting for the geographic proximity of aid 
projects and terrorism. Furthermore, future research could study this question 
qualitatively by observing how aid looks on the ground, and how it affects its intended 
targets. This would be a good way to probe the causal mechanism of this paper, verifying 
the “hearts and mind” and “blowback” theories.  







Abadie, A. (2004). Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism. SSRN 
Electronic Journal.  
Al Qaeda Inspire Magazine. (2010). CIA.  
Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. Science, 299(5612), 1534–1539.  
Atran, S. (2010). The moral logic and growth of suicide terrorism: The Washington 
Quarterly: Vol 29, No 2. Washington Quarterly.  
Atwan, A. B. (2013). After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the next generation. The New Press.  
Azam, J.-P., & Thelen, V. (2010). Foreign Aid Versus Military Intervention in the War 
on Terror. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(2), 237–261.  
Azam, J.-P., & Thelen, V. (2012). “Where to Spend Foreign Aid to Counter Terrorism.”  
Bandyopadhyay, S., & Younas, J. (2011). Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of 
terrorism in developing countries: An empirical assessment. Economics Letters, 
112(2), 171–175.  
Bapat, N. A. (2011, May 25). Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the 
Incentive to Misrepresent. ResearchGate; SAGE Publications.  
Benmelech, E., Berrebi, C., & Klor, E. F. (2012). Economic Conditions and the Quality 
of Suicide Terrorism. The Journal of Politics, 74(1), 113–128.  
Benmelech, E., Berrebi, C., & Klor, E. F. (2015). Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence 
from House Demolitions. The Journal of Politics, 77(1), 27–43.  
Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., & Felter, J. H. (2011). Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The 






Bird, G., Blomberg, S. B., & Hess, G. D. (2008). International Terrorism: Causes, 
Consequences and Cures. The World Economy, 31(2), 255–274.  
Böhnke, J. R., & Zürcher, C. (2013). Aid, minds and hearts: The impact of aid in conflict 
zones. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30(5), 411–432.  
Boutton, A. (2014a). Purchasing Counterterrorism: Three Essays on Foreign Aid and 
Terrorism. In Pennsylvania State University.  
Boutton, A. (2014b). US foreign aid, interstate rivalry, and incentives for 
counterterrorism cooperation. Journal of Peace Research, 51(6), 741–754.  
Boutton, A. (2016). Of terrorism and revenue: Why foreign aid exacerbates terrorism in 
personalist regimes. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 36(4), 359–384.  
Boutton, A. (2019). Military Aid, Regime Vulnerability and the Escalation of Political 
Violence. British Journal of Political Science, 1–19.  
Boutton, A., & Carter, D. B. (2013). Fair-Weather Allies? Terrorism and the Allocation 
of US Foreign Aid. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(7), 1144–1173.  
Bristol, N. (2006). Military incursions into aid work anger humanitarian groups. The 
Lancet, 367(9508), 384–386.  
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2009). A Political Economy of Aid. International 
Organization, 63(2), 309–340.  
Bueno De Mesquita, E. (2005). The Quality of Terror. American Journal of Political 
Science, 49(3), 515–530.  
Burke, J. (2004). Al Qaeda. Foreign Policy, 142, 18. 
Byman, D. 2005. Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge, UK:  





Choi, S.-W., & Piazza, J. A. (2016). Ethnic groups, political exclusion and domestic 
terrorism: Defence and Peace Economics: Vol 27, No 1. Defence and Peace 
Economics.  
Chrisafis, A., Borger, J., McCurry, J., & Macalister, T. (2013, January 25). Algeria 
hostage crisis: the full story of the kidnapping in the desert. The Guardian; The 
Guardian.  
Cowell-Meyers, K., & Arthur, P. (2020). Irish Republican Army: Additional Information 
| Britannica. In Encyclopædia Britannica.  
Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13(4), 379.  
Crost, B., Felter, J. H., & Johnston, P. B. (2016). Conditional cash transfers, civil conflict 
and insurgent influence: Experimental evidence from the Philippines. Journal of 
Development Economics, 118, 171–182.  
Crost, B., Felter, J., & Johnston, P. (2014). Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and 
Civil Conflict. The American Economic Review, 104(6), 1833–1856.  
Dawson, S. (2014). Aid workers in conflict zones no longer immune, now targeted. 
Thomas Reuters Foundation.  
de Ree, J., & Nillesen, E. (2009). Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign aid on 
the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Development 
Economics, 88(2), 301–313.  
Desker, B., & Acharya, A. (2006). Countering the Global Islamist Terrorist Threat. 





Degterev, D. A., Li, Y., Trusova, A. A., & Cherniaev, M. S. (2018). Priorities of Russian 
and Chinese Development Cooperation to Asia and Africa: A Comparative 
Analysis. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 18(4), 888-905.  
Dimant, E., Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2019). Negative Returns: U.S. Military Aid, 
Domestic Institutions and Anti-American Terrorism. SSRN Electronic Journal.  
Djankov, S., Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2008). The Curse of Aid. Journal of 
Economic Growth, 13(3), 169–194.  
Doucouliagos, H., & Paldam, M. (2009). The Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad 
Results Of 40 Years Of Research. Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(3), 433–461.  
Dreher, A., Eichenauer, V. Z., & Gehring, K. (2014). Geopolitics, Aid and Growth.  
Du Bois, C., & Buts, C. (2014). Military support and transnational terrorism. Defence and 
Peace Economics, 27(5), 626–643.  
Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013). Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence 
from Colombia. The Review of Economic Studies, 80(4), 1384–1421.  
Fast, L. (2014). Aid in danger: The perils and promise of humanitarianism. University of 
Pennsylvania Press.  
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. The 
American Political Science Review, 97(1), 75–90.  
Feldmann, A. E. (2018). Revolutionary Terror in the Colombian Civil War: Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism: Vol 41, No 10. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.  
Findley, M. G. (2018). Does Foreign Aid Build Peace? Annual Review of Political 





Findley, M. G., Powell, J., Strandow, D., & Tanner, J. (2011). The Localized Geography 
of Foreign Aid: A New Dataset and Application to Violent Armed Conflict. 
World Development, 39(11), 1995–2009.  
Findley, M. G., & Young, J. K. (2007). Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize 
an Insurgency: Civil Wars: Vol 9, No 4. Civil Wars.  
Findley, M. G., & Young, J. K. (2012). Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal 
Approach to a Conceptual Problem. Perspectives on Politics, 10(2), 285–305.  
Gaibulloev, K., Piazza, J. A., & Sandler, T. (2017). Regime Types and Terrorism. 
International Organization, 71(3), 491–522.  
Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T. (2019). What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 
9/11. Journal of Economic Literature, 57(2), 275–328.  
Gallup, I. (2001, December 21). Latest Summary: American Public Opinion and the War 
on Terrorism. Gallup.com.  
Ginges, J. (2019). The Moral Logic of Political Violence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
23(1), 1–3.  
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) | START.umd.edu. (2018).  
Goodhand, J. (2010). Aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in 
Afghanistan: Third World Quarterly: Vol 23, No 5. Third World Quarterly.  
Gries, T., Meierrieks, D., & Redlin, M. (2014). Oppressive governments, dependence on 
the USA, and anti-American terrorism. Oxford Economic Papers, 67(1), 83–103.  
Grossman, H. I. (1991). A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections. The American 





Hoeffler, A. (2012, October). Growth, Aid and Policies in Countries Recovering From 
War. Centre for the Study of African Economies.  
Hoeffler, A., & Outram, V. (2011). Need, Merit, or Self-Interest-What Determines the 
Allocation of Aid? Review of Development Economics, 15(2), 237–250.  
ISIS. (2016). Why We Hate You and Why We Fight You. Dabiq. 
Jadoon, A. (2019). Playing dirty to survive: the vulnerability of civilian targets within 
U.S. military aid recipient states: Small Wars & Insurgencies: Vol 30, No 3. 
Small Wars & Insurgencies.  
Jaeger, D. A., & Siddique, Z. (2018). Are Drone Strikes Effective in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan? On the Dynamics of Violence between the United States and the 
Taliban. CESifo Economic Studies, 64(4), 667–697.  
Jenkins, B. M. (2011). Al Qaeda After Bin Laden: Implications for American Strategies. 
In RAND Corporation.  
Johnston, P. B., & Sarbahi, A. K. (2016). The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism 
in Pakistan. International Studies Quarterly, 60(2), 203–219.  
Jones, S. G., & Libicki, M. C. (2008). How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for 
Countering al Qa’ida. RAND Corporation.  
Jordan, J. (2009). When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership 
Decapitation: Security Studies: Vol 18, No 4. Security Studies.  
Jordan, J. (2014). Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark. International Security, 38(4), 
7–38.  






Kalyvas, S. N. (2004). The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War. The Journal of Ethics, 
8(1), 97–138.  
Kellner, D. (2002). September 11, Terrorism, and Blowback. Cultural Studies <-> 
Cntical Methodologies, 2(1), 27–39. Sage Publications.  
Kitano, N., & Harada, Y. (2015). Estimating China’s Foreign Aid 2001-2013. Journal of 
International Development, 28(7), 1050–1074. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3081 
Khanna, G., & Zimmermann, L. (2017). Guns and butter? Fighting violence with the 
promise of development. Journal of Development Economics, 124, 120–141.  
Kilhoffer, Z. D. (2016). Purchasing peace: The foreign aid terrorism nexus. Pro Quest.  
Kim, W., Li, D., & Sandler, T. (2019). Resident Terrorist Groups, Military Aid, and 
Moral Hazard: Further Empirical Analysis. Defence and Peace Economics, 1–17.  
Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2010). Terrorism in the Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(6), 902–939.  
Krueger, A. B., & Malečková, J. (2003). Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a 
Causal Connection? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 119–144.  
Krueger, A., & Laitin, D. (2003). Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and 
Targets of Terrorism. 
Kruglanski, A. W., Chen, X., Dechesne, M., Fishman, S., & Orehek, E. (2009). Fully 
Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal 
Significance. Political Psychology, 30(3), 331–357.  
Lia, B., & Skjølberg, K. (2000). Why terrorism occurs - a survey of theories and 






Liu, H., Muhammadi, Iqtidar, H., & Jaffar, A. (2019). The Strategic Purposes of the Post-
9/11 US Foreign Aid To Pakistan And Its Impacts. Global Journal of Political 
Science and Administration, 7(2), 50–66. 
Ly, P.-E. (2007). The Charitable Activities of Terrorist Organizations. Public Choice, 
131(1/2), 177–195.  
Maddison, A. (2012). Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 
AD.  
Meierrieks, D., Krieger, T., & Dimant, E. (2020). Paying Them to Hate US: The Effect of 
U.S. Military Aid on Anti-American Terrorism, 1968-2014. In Beiträge zur 
Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2020: Gender Economics.  
Miles, W. F. S. (2012). Deploying Development to Counter Terrorism: Post-9/11 
Transformation of U.S. Foreign Aid to Africa. African Studies Review, 55(3), 27–
60.  
Nemeth, S. C., & Mauslein, J. A. (2017). Generosity Is a Dangerous Game: Aid 
Allocation and the Risks of Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 32(2), 
382–400.  
Newman, E. (2006). Exploring the “Root Causes” of Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 29(8), 749–772.  
Nielsen, R. A., Findley, M. G., Davis, Z. S., Candland, T., & Nielson, D. L. (2011). 
Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict. American Journal of 
Political Science, 55(2), 219–232.  






Pan Am flight 103 | Overview, Crash, Victims, & Facts | Britannica. (2020). In 
Encyclopædia Britannica.  
Pfaff, W. (2010). Manufacturing Insecurity: How Militarism Endangers America. 
Foreign Affairs, 89(6), 133–140.  
Phillips, B. J. (2015). How Does Leadership Decapitation Affect Violence? The Case of 
Drug Trafficking Organizations in Mexico. The Journal of Politics, 77(2), 324–
336.  
Piazza, J. A. (2011). Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. 
Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 339–353.  
Pillar, P. R. 2004. Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press 
President Bush Addresses the Nation. (2001, September 20). Washingtonpost.com.  
Savun, B., & Phillips, B. J. (2009). Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism. Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 53(6), 878–904.  
Savun, B., & Tirone, D. C. (2012). Exogenous Shocks, Foreign Aid, and Civil War. 
International Organization, 66(3), 363–393.  
Schneider, F., Brück, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2014). The Economics Of Counterterrorism: 
A Survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 29(1), 131–157.  
Serafino, N. (2014). Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues 
for Congress. In Congressional Research Service.  
Smith, M., & Walsh, J. I. (2013). Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence From 





St. John, P. (1996, January). Commentary No. 65: Insurgency, Legitimacy & Intervention 
in Algeria.  
Stanton, J. A. (2013). Terrorism in the Context of Civil War. The Journal of Politics, 
75(4), 1009–1022. 
Stern, J. (2004, June 6). Beneath Bombast and Bombs, a Caldron of Humiliation. Los 
Angeles Times; Los Angeles Times.  
Stern, J. (2020, October). How America Created a Terrorist Haven. ResearchGate; 
unknown.  
The 9/11 Commission Report: Executive Summary. (n.d.). Npr.org.  
Themnér, L., & Wallensteen, P. (2012). Armed Conflicts, 1946–2011. Journal of Peace 
Research, 49(4), 565–575.  
Thompson, W. R. & Dreyer, D. (2011). Handbook of Interstate Rivalry, 1494-2010. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Total incidents by country (1997-2019) | Aid Worker Security Database. (2019).  
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). (2018). The Greenbook: U.S. 
Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–
September 30, 2018. 
Udoh, I. J., Oladejo, M. O., & Okafor, L. U. (2019). The Boomerang Effect of Some 
Counterterrorism (CT) Measure: A Mathematical Game-Theoretic Model. 
International Journal of Advances in Scientific Research and Engineering, 5(2).  
Wallensteen, P. (2018). Understanding conflict resolution. Sage. 
Waśko–Owsiejczuk, E. (2016). The American Military Strategy to Combat the “Islamic 
State” in Iraq and Syria: Assumptions, Tactics and Effectiveness. Polish Political 





Weintraub, M. (2016). Do All Good Things Go Together? Development Assistance and 
Insurgent Violence in Civil War. The Journal of Politics.  
Wilson, M. C., & Piazza, J. A. (2013). Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects 
of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks. American Journal of Political 
Science, n/a-n/a.  
Wood, R. M. (2010). Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians. Journal of 
Peace Research, 47(5), 601–614.  
Wood, R. M., & Sullivan, C. (2015). Doing Harm by Doing Good? The Negative 
Externalities of Humanitarian Aid Provision during Civil Conflict. The Journal of 
Politics, 77(3), 736–748.  
World Bank. (2014). World Development Indicators. World Bank.  
Young, J. K., & Findley, M. G. (2011). Can peace be purchased? A sectoral-level 
analysis of aid’s influence on transnational terrorism. Public Choice, 149(3-4), 
365–381.  
Zech, S. T. (2016). Decapitation, disruption, and unintended consequences in 
counterterrorism: lessons from Islamist terror networks in Spain: Defense & 
Security Analysis: Vol 32, No 2. Defense & Security Analysis.  
Zürcher, C. (2017). What Do We (Not) Know About Development Aid and Violence? A 







Analysis of Logged Count Model with No Lag 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 (country-level fixed effects) present the incidence rate 
ratios from the negative binomial regressions that estimate the impact of logged 
economic and military aid on terrorist attacks with no lag The results of this regression 
are summarized here:  
• Appendix Figure 1 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 1 of 
Appendix Table 1: where there is no control for unobserved inter-country 
heterogeneity, both types of aid are positively associated with total attacks 
when the other type of aid is at average level. 
• Appendix Figure 2 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 3 of 
Appendix Table 1: when we do not control for unobserved inter-country 
heterogeneity, both types of aid are positively associated with US targeted 
attacks when the other type of aid is at average level. 
• Appendix Figure 3 visualizes the interaction effect based on Model 7 of 
Appendix Table 2: when we control for unobserved inter-country 
heterogeneity economic aid is positively associated with total attacks 
when the military aid is at average level. 
• Controls: all results are consistent with prior literature except for:  
- Increases in GDP are associated with more terrorism, which contradicts 
finding that wealthier states are less likely they are to experience 
domestic terrorist attacks (Krueger and Malečková 2003). My results 





Appendix Table 1 
Logged Aid and Terrorism Count Model  
















Attacks (logged)  






























































































































































Number of Observations 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 
2 x Log Likelihood -30,954.93 -15,660.72 -7,163.70 -3,156.33 -26,114.07 -12,674.14 
AIC 30,984.93 15,690.72 7,193.70 3,186.33 26,144.07 12,704.14 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.14 
Overdispersion parameter alpha 6.46 0.75 11.98 3.64 5.46 1.00 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically 








Appendix Figure 1 
Conditional Effects of Logged Aid on Terrorist Attacks 
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 









Appendix Figure 2 
Conditional Effects of Logged Aid on US Targeted Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level. Graph (b) 
visualizes the conditional effect of logged military aid on US targeted terrorism holding economic aid at mean level. The estimates are based on Model 3 of 






Appendix Table 2  
Logged Aid and Terrorism Count Model with CFE  































































































































































































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 6,497 6,497 6,497 6,497 6,497 6,497 
2 x Log Likelihood -.28,233.13 -13,099.99 -5,950.83 -2,385.37 -23,145.22 -10,230.69 
AIC 28,545.13 13,411.99 6,262.83 2,697.37 23,457.22 10,542.69 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.27 0.23 0.35 0.19 0.31 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.15 0.03 3.22 0.52 2.36 0.03 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are 
all statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 8 and 12. Re-estimating models 8 and 12 with a Poisson 








Appendix Figure 3 
Conditional Effect of Logged Aid on Terrorist Attacks with CFE 
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of logged economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level 
controlling for inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of logged military aid on total targeted terrorism holding economic aid at 





Appendix Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Economic and Military Aid 





Economic Aid 0 110,500,000 33,360,000,000* 532,928,257 9581 
Economic Aidt-1 0 110,600,000 33,360,000,000* 533,008,195 9578 
Economic Aidt-3 0 111,100,000 33,360,000,000* 537,495,507 9358 
Economic Aidt-5 0 111,300,000 33,360,000,000* 545,908,839 9006 
Economic Aidt-7 0 111,100,000 33,360,000,000* 554,497,236 8628 
Economic Aidt-10 0 112,800,000 33,360,000,000* 570,313,215 8062 
Military Aid 0 75,100,000 13,910,000,000 484,670,555 9581 
Military Aidt-1 0 75,130,000 13,910,000,000 484,744,648 9578 
Military Aidt-3 0 74,870,000 13,910,000,000 478,408,178 9385 
Military Aidt-5 0 74,330,000 13,910,000,000 467,250,965 9006 
Military Aidt-7 0 73,880,000 13,910,000,000 461,611,753 8628 
Military Aidt-10 0 74,420,000 13,910,000,000 463,283,802 8062 
*This number represents the amount of aid the US gave to the UK in 1947 and is not used in the regressions as 
the terrorism data begins in 1970 
Analysis of Non-Logged Count Models  
As is seen in the paper (see Appendix Table 3 and Figure 3), the variables of 
economic and military aid are extremely right skewed. Running the regressions without 
logging the data results in substantively negligible effects, even when they are 
statistically significant. 
• Appendix Tables 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14 present the incident rate ratios of the 
negative binomial count model without controlling for inter-country 





• Appendix Tables 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15 present the incident rate ratios of the 
negative binomial count model with control for inter-country heterogeneity, with 
no lag, 1-, 3-. 5-, 7-, and 10- year lags, respectively.  
• All figures show the unsubstantial nature of the regressions. As all the results 






Appendix Table 4 
Aid and Terrorism Binomial Count Model 






























































































































































































Number of Observations 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 
2 x Log Likelihood -31,068.15 -15,682.82 -7,054.29 -3,178.79 -26,229.71 -12,700.12 
AIC 31,098.15 15,712.82 7,084.29 3,208.79 26,259.71 12,730.12 
Pseudo R2 0.63 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.64 0.74 8.35 3.98 5.61 0.99 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically discernible 







Appendix Figure 4 
Conditional Effect of Aid on Terrorist Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) visualizes the 








Appendix Figure 5 
Conditional Effect of Aid on US Targeted Attacks 
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) 










Appendix Table 5  
Aid and Terrorism Binomial Count Model with CFE  

















































































































































































Country-level fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 
2 x Log Likelihood -28,277.07 -13,138.41 -5,946.76 -2.362.90 -23,201.58 -10,268.06 
AIC 28,589.07 13,450.41 6,258.76 2,674.90 23,513.58 10,580.06 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.27 0.24 0.35 0.19 0.31 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.19 0.04 3.05 0.39 2.40 0.04 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are 
all statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 20 and 24. Re-estimating models 20 and 24 with a Poisson 










Appendix Figure 6 
Conditional Effect of Aid on Terrorist Attacks with CFE  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level controlling for 
inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of military aid on total targeted terrorism holding economic aid at mean level controlling 






Appendix Table 6 
Aidt-1 and Terrorism Binomial Count Model  





























































































































































































Number of Observations 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 
2 x Log Likelihood -31,072.32 -15,680.26 -7,113.24 -3,198.25 -26,233.15 -12,699.10 
AIC 31,102.32 15,710.26 7,143.24 3,228.25 26,2623.15 12,729.09 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.64 0.74 8.84 4.07 5.62 0.99 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically discernible 







Appendix Figure 7 
Conditional Effect of Aidt-1 on Terrorist Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) visualizes the 








Appendix Figure 8 
Conditional Effect of Aidt-1 on US Targeted Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) 









Appendix Table 7 
Aidt-1 and Terrorism Binomial Count Model with CFE  






























































































































































































Country-level fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 6497 
2 x Log Likelihood -28,274.57 -13,139.42 -5,966.55 -2,393.30 _23,202.39 -10,271.55 
AIC 28,586.57 13,451.42 6,278.55 2,705.30 23,514.39 10,583.55 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.27 0.23 0.34 0.19 0.31 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.19 0.04 3.19 0.52 2.40 0.04 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are all 
statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 32 and 36. Re-estimating models 32 and 36 with a Poisson regression 









Appendix Figure 9 
Conditional Effect of Aidt-1 on Terrorist Attacks with CFE 
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at 
mean level controlling for inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of military aid on total targeted 
terrorism holding economic aid at mean level controlling for inter-country heterogeneity. The estimates are based on Model 31 of 






Appendix Table 8 
Aidt-3 and Terrorism Binomial Count Model 






























































































































































































Number of Observations 6432 6432 6432 6432 6432 6432 
2 x Log Likelihood -30,860.09 -15,571.33 -7,113.51 -3,207.39 -26,064.60 -12,621.99 
AIC 30,890.09 15,601.33 7,143.51 3,237.39 26,094.60 12,652.00 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.64 0.74 9.23 4.21 5.61 0.99 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically discernible 









Appendix Figure 10  
Conditional Effect of Aidt-3 on Terrorist Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) visualizes the 









Appendix Figure 11 
Conditional Effect of Aidt-3 on US Targeted Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) 








Appendix Table 9 
Aidt-3 and Terrorism Binomial Count Model with CFE  






























































































































































































Country-level fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 6432 6432 6432 6432 6432 6432 
2 x Log Likelihood -28,093.26 -13,038.20 -5,932.17 -2,406.67 -23,059.91 -10,198.34 
AIC 28,405.26 13,350.20 6,244.17 2,718.67 23,371.91 10,510.34 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.27 0.23 0.34 0.19 0.31 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.19 0.03 3.24 0.61 2.40 0.04 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are 
all statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 44 and 48. Re-estimating models 44 and 48 with a Poisson 











Appendix Figure 12  
Conditional Effect of Aidt-3 on Terrorist Attacks with CFE  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level controlling for 
inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of military aid on total targeted terrorism holding economic aid at mean level controlling 





Appendix Table 10 
Aidt-5 and Terrorism Binomial Count Model 






























































































































































































Number of Observations 6316 6316 6316 6316 6316 6316 
2 x Log Likelihood -30,517.06 -15,381.38 -7,047.33 -3,189.98 -25,784.91 -12,475.37 
AIC 30,547.06 15,411.38 7,077.33 3,219.98 25,814.91 12,505.37 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.61 0.74 9.13 4.16 5.59 0.98 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically 









Appendix Figure 13  
Conditional Effect of Aidt-5 on Terrorist Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) visualizes the 










Appendix Figure 14 
Conditional Effect of Aidt-5 on US Targeted Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) 










Appendix Table 11 
Aidt-5 and Terrorism Binomial Count Model with CFE  






























































































































































































Country-level fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 6316 6316 6316 6316 6316 6316 
2 x Log Likelihood -27,810.22 -12,871.85 -5,894.90 -2,393.41 -22,830.75 -10,066.53 
AIC 28,122.22 13,183.85 6,206.90 2,705.41 23,142.75 10,378.53 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.27 0.23 0.34 0.19 0.31 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.18 0.03 3.22 0.61 2.39 0.03 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are all 
statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 56 and 60. Re-estimating models 56 and 60 with a Poisson regression 












Appendix Figure 15 
Conditional Effect of Aidt-5 on Terrorist Attacks with CFE  
 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level controlling for 
inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of military aid on total targeted terrorism holding economic aid at mean level controlling 









Appendix Table 12 
Aidt-7 and Terrorism Binomial Count Model  

















































































































































































Number of Observations 6113 6113 6113 6113 6113 6113 
2 x Log Likelihood -30,151.93 -15,147.71 -7,003.80 -3,176.26 -25,480.33 -12,308.81 
AIC 30,181.93 15,177.71 7,033.80 3,206,26 25,510.33 12,338.31 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.46 0.71 9.05 4.09 5.48 0.95 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically 









Appendix Figure 16  
Conditional Effect of Aidt-7 on Terrorist Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) visualizes the 










Appendix Figure 17 
Conditional Effect of Aidt-7 on US Targeted Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) 








Appendix Table 13 
Aidt-7 and Terrorism Binomial Count Model with CFE  

















































































































































































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 6113 6113 6113 6113 6113 6113 
2 x Log Likelihood -25,525.94 -12,687.85 -5,862.37 -2,388.29 -22,602.56 -9,941.75 
AIC 27,837.94 12,999.85 6,174.37 2,700.29 22,914.56 10,253.75 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.27 0.23 0.33 0.18 0.31 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 3.14 0.02 3.20 0.59 2.36 0.02 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are all 
statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 68 and 72. Re-estimating models 68 and 72 with a Poisson regression 















Appendix Figure 18  
Conditional Effect of Aidt-7 on Terrorist Attacks with CFE  
 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level controlling for 
inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of military aid on total targeted terrorism holding economic aid at mean level controlling 





Appendix Table 14 
Aidt-10 and Terrorism Binomial Count Model  






























































































































































































Number of Observations 6316 5784 5784 5784 5784 5784 
2 x Log Likelihood -29,458.90 -14,746.09 -6,907.78 -3,140.03 -24,900.72 -12,034.67 
AIC 29,488.89 14,776.09 6,937.78 3,170.03 24,930.72 12,064.67 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.14 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.22 0.69 8.79 3.96 5.30 0.92 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Alpha levels are all statistically 








Appendix Figure 19 
Conditional Effect of Aidt-10 on Terrorist Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the total number of terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) visualizes the 








Appendix Figure 20 
Conditional Effect of Aidt-10 on US Targeted Attacks  
 
(a) (b) 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of military aid on the number of US targeted terrorist attacks holding economic aid at mean level. Graph (b) 









Appendix Table 15 
Aidt-10 and Terrorism Binomial Count Model with CFE 






























































































































































































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 5784 5784 5784 5784 5784 5784 
2 x Log Likelihood -29,442.94 -12,393.41 -5,809.22 -2,376.32 -22,185.42 -9,757.55 
AIC 29,474.94 12,705.41 6,121.22 2,688.32 22,497.42 10,069.55 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.26 0.22 0.33 0.18 0.30 
Overdispersion Parameter Alpha 6.19 0.01 3.19 0.58 2.33 0.01 
Note: Incidence rate ratios are reported in cells, standard errors in parentheses. Overdispersion parameters alpha are all 
statistically discernible from 0, expect for models 80 and 84. Re-estimating models 80 and 84 with a Poisson regression 








Appendix Figure 21 
Conditional Effect of Aidt-10 on Terrorist Attacks with CFE  
 
Note: Graph (a) charts the conditional effect of economic aid on the number of total targeted terrorist attacks holding military aid at mean level controlling for 
inter-country heterogeneity. Graph (b) visualizes the conditional effect of military aid on total targeted terrorism holding economic aid at mean level controlling 
for inter-country heterogeneity. The estimates are based on Model 79 of Appendix Table 15. 
 
